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Abstract 
The economic evaluation of health care interventions including new health technologies such as 
branded pharmaceuticals requires an assessment of whether the improvement in health outcomes 
they offer exceeds the improvement in health that would have been possible if the additional 
resources required had, instead, been made available for other health care activities. Therefore, 
some assessment of these health opportunity costs is required if the best use is to be made of the 
resources available for health care. This report provides a brief review of the literature on the 
assessment of health opportunity costs, outlines how existing estimates of the effect of changes in 
health expenditure on mortality, as well as survival and morbidity, can be used to provide some 
initial assessment of the possible health opportunity costs associated with additional health care 
costs for the different states of India. The resulting estimated range for India is 14,116 to 22,275 
2015 INR (223 to 351 2015 USD). Estimated ranges for the states range from 4,747 to 7,338 2015 INR 
(75 to 116 2015 USD) for Bihar to 27,370 to 42,701 2015 INR (432 to 673 2015 USD) for Himachal 
Pradesh and higher for Delhi. This wide range of possible estimates based on existing work are 
discussed and some suggestions are made of how further research could provide estimates that 
more closely reflect evidence of the health effects of health care expenditure in the Indian states. 
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Introduction 
Evidence on the expected costs and health effects of making a new health technology available to 
specific populations in a particular setting and health care system (HCS) are often summarised as 
incremental cost-effectiveness ratios (ICERs). These ratios are often expressed as the cost per 
Quality Adjusted Life Year (QALY) gained or the cost per Disability Adjusted Life Year (DALY) averted 
(Salomon et al. 2012). These measures provide a useful summary of how much additional resource is 
required to achieve a measured improvement in health (the additional cost required to gain one 
QALY or to avert one DALY). Whether the cost per QALY gained or DALY averted offered by an 
intervention is regarded as worthwhile requires a comparison with a cost-ĞĨĨĞĐƚŝǀĞŶĞƐƐ ?ƚŚƌĞƐŚŽůĚ ? ?
An effective intervention will only improve health outcomes overall (i.e. produce a positive net 
health benefit) if the additional health benefits exceed the health opportunity costs associated with 
the additional health care costs that must be found from existing commitments or that use 
additional expenditure that could have been devoted to other health care activities. Such an 
assessment of health opportunity cost reflects the maximum a HCS can afford to pay for the health 
benefits that a new health technology offers, without reducing health outcomes overall. Therefore, 
an evidence based assessment of health opportunity costs is critical to the appropriate pricing of 
new branded pharmaceuticals while they are protected by patent (Claxton et al. 2008; Claxton et al. 
2011). 
 
To ensure that decisions improve rather than reduce health outcomes overall, judgements about 
cost-effectiveness ought to be founded on evidence of the likely health opportunity costs in the HCS 
where the use of a new technology is being considered. Most previous work concerning health 
opportunity costs has focused on national HCS, but many countries have decentralised HCS at a 
regional, state or state level. It is therefore important that health opportunity costs are informed by 
research at the level at which budgets are set and decisions are made (and opportunity costs are 
incurred). 
 
A persistent problem has been that the cost-ĞĨĨĞĐƚŝǀĞŶĞƐƐ ?ƚŚƌĞƐŚŽůĚƐ ? ?Ğ ?Ő ?ĐŽƐƚƉer QALY or cost per 
DALY thresholds) recommended or cited by decision making and advisory bodies (both national and 
supra-national) reflect a lack of conceptual clarity about what they ought to represent and what type 
of evidence might inform their assessment (Revill et al. 2014; Culyer 2016). As a consequence these 
values are not evidence based and have simply become established norms or implied values, which 
describe the criteria used to judge cost-effectiveness (Claxton, Sculpher, et al. 2015). Other 
proposed thresholds reflect a view of what value ought to be placed on improvements in health. 
They imply what health care expenditure ought to be (the social demand for health) rather than an 
evidence-based assessment of health opportunity costs given actual levels of expenditure, i.e. a 
 ?ƐƵƉƉůǇƐŝĚĞ ?ĞƐƚŝŵĂƚĞŽĨƚŚĞĂŵŽƵŶƚŽĨŚĞĂůƚŚƚŚĂƚĂ,^ĐƵƌƌĞŶƚůǇĚĞůŝǀĞƌƐǁŝƚŚŵŽƌĞŽƌůĞƐƐ
resources. 
 
The problem of estimating a cost-ĞĨĨĞĐƚŝǀĞŶĞƐƐ ?ƚŚƌĞƐŚŽůĚ ?ƚŚĂƚƌĞƉƌĞƐĞŶƚƐĞǆƉĞĐƚĞĚŚĞĂůƚŚ
opportunity costs is the same as estimating the relationship between changes in health care 
expenditure and health outcomes. Estimates of the marginal productivity of health expenditure in 
producing health (QALYs) are becoming available for some high income countries based on 
approaches to estimation which exploit within-country data (Martin et al. 2008; Vallejo-Torres et al. 
2016; Edney et al. 2017; Claxton, Martin, et al. 2015). This evidence from national HCS contexts in 
high income countries can be used to give some indication of possible values in other contexts 
(Woods et al. 2016) based on estimates of the income elasticity of demand for health and 
assumptions about the relative underfunding of HCS (i.e. the shadow price for public expenditure on 
health). Another approach has taken estimates of the effect of health care expenditure on health 
outcomes based on country-level data (typically expressed as elasticities) and applied these to 
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country-level baseline health and demographic ĚĂƚĂƚŽŐĞŶĞƌĂƚĞŽǀĞƌĂůůĐŽƐƚƉĞƌ>z ?ƚŚƌĞƐŚŽůĚƐ ?
for low- and middle-income countries (LMICs) (Ochalek et al. 2018). 
 
/ŶĚŝĂ ?ƐDŝŶŝƐƚƌǇŽĨ,ĞĂůƚŚĂŶĚ&ĂŵŝůǇtĞůĨĂƌĞŝƐŝŶƚŚĞƉƌŽĐĞƐƐŽĨĞƐƚĂďůŝƐŚŝŶŐĂŵĞĚŝĐĂůƚĞĐhnology 
assessment board (MTAB) as part of a recent commitment to moving toward universal health 
coverage using health technology assessment (HTA) to inform reimbursement decisions for state 
budgets for health care (Downey et al. 2017). MTAB will be the central organization undertaking HTA 
in India, with key partners in India and internationally. Ensuring ƚŚĞĂŐĞŶĐǇ ?Ɛ recommendations 
improve, rather than reduce, health outcomes overall requires quantifying the health that would 
have been possible if the money required to reimburse or fund one intervention was instead made 
available for other interventions (i.e. the health opportunity cost) (Prinja et al. 2015). However, like 
in many other jurisdictions, there is no explicit and empirically-ŝŶĨŽƌŵĞĚ ?ƚŚƌĞƐŚŽůĚ ?ƚŚĂƚƌĞĨůĞĐƚƐƚŚĞ
likely health opportunity costs so it is not possible to assess the likely net health effect of approving 
a new health technology or establish what price ought to be paid for new pharmaceuticals protected 
by patent. This report details the methodology that was used to generate state-level estimates of 
health opportunity costs (ĐŽƐƚƉĞƌ>z ?ƚŚƌĞƐŚŽůĚƐ ?). In broad terms, this involved tailoring the 
approach taken by Ochalek et al. (2018) to consider health opportunity costs that occur at the 
provincial level using state specific data on health expenditure, epidemiology and demographics. 
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Methods 
The effect of different levels of health care expenditure on mortality outcomes has been 
investigated in a number of published studies using country-level data, many including high- as well 
as low- and medium-income countries (Gallet & Doucouliagos 2017). The challenge is to control for 
all the other reasons why mortality might differ between countries in order to isolate the causal 
effect of differences in health expenditure (Nakamura et al. 2016). This is a particular challenge even 
if available measures are complete, accurate and unbiased because health outcomes are likely to be 
influenced by expenditure (increases in expenditure improves outcomes), but outcomes are also 
likely to influence expenditure (poor outcomes prompt greater efforts and increased expenditure). 
This problem of endogeneity, as well as the inevitable aggregation bias, risks underestimating the 
health effects of changes in expenditure. Instrumental variables have been used in a number of 
studies to try and overcome this problem and estimate outcome elasticities for all-cause adult, 
maternal and child mortality (Bokhari et al. 2007 among others). The Bokhari et al (2007) model 
specification applies an instrumental variable approach to cross-sectional data from the year 2000 
for 127 countries and models both public expenditure on health and a country's GDP as endogenous 
variables (both in per capita terms). Specifically, the identification strategy of Bokhari et al (2007) 
employs two instrumental variables: military expenditure per capita of neighbouring countries and a 
measure of institutional quality. These represent typical instrumental variables following in the 
tradition of earlier papers such as Filmer & Pritchett (1999). In addition, Bokhari et al (2007) perform 
a logarithmic transformation of their data so that coefficients can be interpreted as elasticities, and 
allow for the outcome elasticity with respect to expenditure of countries to vary by two variables: 
ƚŚĞůĞǀĞůŽĨŝŶĨƌĂƐƚƌƵĐƚƵƌĞ ?ƉƌŽǆŝĞĚďǇ ?ƉĂǀĞĚ ƌŽĂĚƐƉĞƌƵŶŝƚŽĨĂƌĞĂ ? ?ĂŶĚƐŚŽĐŬŝŶĚŽŶŽƌĨƵŶĚŝŶŐ
(measured by absolute deviation in current donor funding from historical mean). 
 
This approach to estimation using country-level data can provide country specific cost per DALY 
ĂǀĞƌƚĞĚǀĂůƵĞƐďǇĂƉƉůǇŝŶŐĞƐƚŝŵĂƚĞĚĞůĂƐƚŝĐŝƚŝĞƐ ?ǁŚŝĐŚƚĂŬĞĂĐĐŽƵŶƚŽĨŵĞĂƐƵƌĞƐŽĨĂĐŽƵŶƚƌǇ ?Ɛ
infrastructure and changes in donor funding, to country specific mortality rates, conditional life 
expectancies and population distribution (all by age and gender) as well as estimates of disability 
burden of disease and total health care expenditure. We re-estimate the effect of changes in 
ĞǆƉĞŶĚŝƚƵƌĞƵƐŝŶŐŽŬŚĂƌŝĞƚĂů ? ? ? ? ? ? ?ƐĚĂƚĂƐĞƚĂĨƚĞƌĞǆƉĂŶĚŝŶŐƚŚĞĚĂƚĂƐĞt to include under-5 
mortality from the World Bank in addition to adult male and adult female mortality, which enables 
greater coverage of the population, as well as: i) a measure of survival, years of life lost (YLLs); ii) a 
measure of morbidity, years of life disabled (YLDs); and iii) DALYs, a generic measure of overall ill 
health, from the Global Burden of Disease (GBD) database. Elasticities are estimated at the country-
level and differ only with respect to the interaction of measures of infrastructure and donor funding. 
The estimated elasticities for India (see Table 2) are applied to state specific data on health 
expenditure, epidemiology and demographics, i.e. in the absence of elasticity estimates at state level 
the estimate for India are assumed to be common across the states. Nonetheless, the health effects 
of changes in health expenditure will differ across states due to differences in health expenditure, 
epidemiology and demographics. 
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There are four ways in which the estimated elasticities in Table 2 can be used to estimate the likely 
DALYs averted as a consequence of a 1% change in health expenditure in each state, i. Each of the 
four ways in which a cost per DALY can be estimated are summarised in Table 1 and are briefly 
described below, with details of the data used reported in Appendix A. 
 
Table 1. Alternative approaches to calculating DALYs averted 
  DALY 1 DALY 2 DALY 3 DALY 4 
 
Survival 
effects 
(YLLs 
averted) 
 Based on 
indirectly 
estimating 
effects on 
survival from 
mortality (A) 
 
 
Directly estimated (D) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Directly 
estimated 
(G) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Morbidity 
Effects 
(YLDs 
averted) 
 
 
 
 
Direct 
effect 
 
Uses indirectly 
estimated 
effects on 
survival from 
mortality as a 
surrogate for 
morbidity 
effects (B) 
 
Uses directly 
estimated 
survival 
effects as a 
surrogate for 
morbidity 
effects (E) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Directly 
estimated 
(F) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Indirect 
effect 
 
 
 
 
 
Uses average overall population 
health as a surrogate for increase 
in YLD burden associated with 
increase in YLLs averted (C) 
 
DALY 1  
The first estimate is based only on estimates of the mortality effects of changes in expenditure. As 
these are the most prevalent estimates available across the literature, this enables DALY 1 to be 
calculated using elasticities from various sources, such as the all-cause mortality elasticities that 
have been estimated in the UK as part of work on health opportunity costs (Claxton et al. 2017; 
Andrews et al. 2017).  
 
The estimated elasticity for children under-5, א௠௢௥௧௔௟௜௧௬, can be applied to the number of deaths 
observed in this age group in each state (denoted by the i subscript) to provide an estimate of the 
number of deaths averted as a consequence of a 1% change in state health expenditure.   
 
(1) ݀݅ݎ݁ܿݐ݈ݕ݁ݏݐ݅݉ܽݐ݁݀݀݁ܽݐ݄ݏܽݒ݁ݎݐ݁݀௜଴ିସ ൌ  ? ?כ ቚ߳ூ௡ௗ௜௔௠௢௥௧௔௟௜௧௬బషరቚ כ ݀݁ܽݐ݄ݏ௜଴ିସ 
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Similarly, the estimated elasticities for male and female adults (ages 15-60) are applied to observed 
deaths by age and gender in each state, i.e. assuming that the proportionate effect on mortality 
applies equally across age groups within 15-60 age range. 
 
(2)  ݀݅ݎ݁ܿݐ݈ݕ݁ݏݐ݅݉ܽݐ݁݀݀݁ܽݐ݄ݏܽݒ݁ݎݐ݁݀௜ଵହି଺଴ ൌ  ? ?כ ቚ߳ூ௡ௗ௜௔௠௢௥௧௔௟௜௧௬భఱషలబቚ כ ݀݁ܽݐ݄ݏ௜ଵହିଵଽ ൅ ڮ ൅ ? ?כ ቚ߳ூ௡ௗ௜௔௠௢௥௧௔௟௜௧௬భఱషలబቚ כ ݀݁ܽݐ݄ݏ௜ହହି଺଴ 
 
Once the likely deaths averted by a 1% change in health expenditure have been estimated in this 
way (see (1) and (2), the survival effects can be established by applying conditional life expectancy 
(CLE) at age of death to each death averted within each age group (see (3) and (4)). An estimate of 
survival gains of a change in health expenditure based on mortality effects (mortality based YLL 
averted) is simply the sum of these effects (5). 
 
(3) ݉݋ݎݐ݈ܽ݅ݐݕܾܽݏ݁݀ܻܮܮܽݒ݁ݎݐ݁݀௜଴ିସ ൌ ܥܮܧ௜଴ିସ כ ݀݁ܽݐ݄ݏܽݒ݁ݎݐ݁݀௜଴ିସ 
 
(4) ݉݋ݎݐ݈ܽ݅ݐݕܾܽݏ݁݀ܻܮܮܽݒ݁ݎݐ݁݀௜ଵହି଺଴ ൌ ܥܮܧ௜ଵହିଵଽ כ ݀݁ܽݐ݄ݏܽݒ݁ݎݐ݁݀௜ଵହିଵଽ ൅ ܥܮܧ௜ଶ଴ିଶସ כ݀݁ܽݐ݄ݏܽݒ݁ݎݐ݁݀௜ଶ଴ିଶସ ൅ ڮ ൅ ܥܮܧ௜ହହିହଽ כ ݀݁ܽݐ݄ݏܽݒ݁ݎݐ݁݀௜ହହିହଽ 
 
(5) ݉݋ݎݐ݈ܽ݅ݐݕܾܽݏ݁݀ܻܮܮܽݒ݁ݎݐ݁݀௜଴ିସƬଵହି଺଴ ൌ ݉݋ݎݐ݈ܽ݅ݐݕܾܽݏ݁݀ܻܮܮܽݒ݁ݎݐ݁݀௜଴ିସ ൅݉݋ݎݐ݈ܽ݅ݐݕܾܽݏ݁݀ܻܮܮܽݒ݁ݎݐ݁݀௜ଵହି଺଴ 
 
However, this measure (5) excludes potential survival effects in ages 5-14 years and also those over 
the age of 60. To try to reflect the possible survival effects across all ages the estimate of the 
mortality based YLL averted in (5) can be adjusted using the YLL in these age group as a proportion of 
the YLL across all ages, ߪ௜ (6). 
 
(6) ݉݋ݎݐ݈ܽ݅ݐݕܾܽݏ݁݀ܻܮܮܽݒ݁ݎݐ݁݀௜௔௟௟௔௚௘௦ ൌ ௠௢௥௧௔௟௜௧௬௕௔௦௘ௗ௒௅௅௔௩௘௥௧௘ௗ೔బషరƬభఱషలబఙ೔  
 
where, 
 
(7) ߪ௜ ൌ ௒௅௅೔బషరା௒௅௅೔భఱషలబ௒௅௅೔ೌ ೗೗ೌ೒೐ೞ  
 
The YLL for each age group is simply the observed deaths in that age group multiplied by the 
conditional life expectancy for that age, i.e. it represents the survival burden of disease in each age 
and gender group. For example,   
 
(8) ܻܮܮ௜଴ିସ ൌ ܥܮܧ௜଴ିସ כ ܾܽݏ݋݈ݑݐ݁݀݁ܽݐ݄ݏ௜଴ିସ 
 
(9) ܻܮܮ௜ଵହି଺଴ ൌ ܥܮܧ௜ଵହିଵଽ כ ܾܽݏ݋݈ݑݐ݁݀݁ܽݐ݄ݏ௜ଵହିଵଽ ൅ ܥܮܧ௜ଶ଴ିଶସ כ ܾܽݏ݋݈ݑݐ݁݀݁ܽݐ݄ݏ௜ଶ଴ିଶସ ൅ڮ ൅ ܥܮܧ௜ହହିହଽ כ ܾܽݏ݋݈ݑݐ݁݀݁ܽݐ݄ݏ௜ହହିହଽ 
 
The  ܻܮܮ௜௔௟௟௔௚௘௦  is calculated in a similar way to (8) and (9), as the sum of the product of absolute 
deaths and conditional life expectancy across all age groups in the population. 
 
Therefore, the extrapolation of the survival effects from those age groups where mortality effects 
can be estimated (5) to all age groups in the population (6) assumes that the survival effects of 
changes expenditure are in proportion to the survival burden of disease at each age.      
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There are likely to be direct and indirect effects on morbidity of changes in expenditure. For 
example, changes in expenditure that affect mortality and survival are also likely to have an effect on 
morbidity through the prevention and treatment of disease (i.e. a direct effect decreasing YLD 
burden). However, an indirect effect may also be present as reductions in mortality and the resulting 
increased survival is likely to increase the number of years during which morbidity is experienced.  
 
To calculate the possible direct effect we assume that the effect of changes in expenditure on 
morbidity is proportional to the effect on survival (B in Table 1), i.e. assuming that the estimated 
effects on mortality can be used as a surrogate for likely effects on morbidity where these effects 
have not been directly estimated. The ratio of YLD to YLL in each state ߛ௜, is applied to estimates of 
the state specific survival effects from (6) (see the first term of (12) below). 
 
(10) ߛ௜ ൌ ௒௅஽೔ೌ ೗೗ೌ೒೐ೞ௒௅௅೔ೌ ೗೗ೌ೒೐ೞ  
 
To account for the indirect effect of increasing the number of years during which morbidity is 
experienced due to the survival effects, we apply the per capita YLD burden for each state to the 
state specific survival effects (see the second term in (11) below and C in Table 1). Mortality based 
YLD averted are therefore calculated as: 
 
(11) 
݉݋ݎݐ݈ܽ݅ݐݕܾܽݏ݁݀ܻܮܦܽݒ݁ݎݐ݁݀௜௔௟௟௔௚௘௦ ൌ ݉݋ݎݐ݈ܽ݅ݐݕܾܽݏ݁݀ܻܮܮܽݒ݁ݎݐ݁݀௜௔௟௟௔௚௘௦ כ ߛ௜ െ݉݋ݎݐ݈ܽ݅ݐݕܾܽݏ݁݀ܻܮܮܽݒ݁ݎݐ݁݀௜௔௟௟௔௚௘௦ כ ݌݁ݎܿܽ݌݅ݐܽܻܮܦܾݑݎ݀݁݊௜ 
 
where the first term reflects the possible direct effects of expenditure in reducing morbidity (B in 
Table 1) and the second term captures the indirect effect of increases in morbidity due to increases 
in survival (C in Table 1).  
 
The total DALYs averted due to a 1% change in health expenditure in each state is the sum of the 
survival effects (the YLL averted in (6), A in Table 1) and the net morbidity effects (YLD averted in 
(11), B-C in Table 1). This illustrates how estimates of mortality effects of health expenditure, in the 
form of elasticities, can be used to provide an indication of the likely survival (YLL averted) and 
morbidity effects (YLD averted). Although the elasticities applied to data from the states are for India 
as a whole, the health effects of a 1% change in state health expenditure will differ by state due to 
differences in the number observed deaths by age and gender and differences in age and gender 
specific conditional life expectancies. The amount of expenditure required to avert one DALY will 
also differ by state due to differences in total health expenditure.   
 
(12) ܿ݋ݏݐ݌݁ݎܦܣܮܻܽݒ݁ݎݐ݁݀௜ ൌ ଵ ? כ௚௢௩௘௥௡௠௘௡௧௘௫௣௘௡ௗ௜௧௨௥௘௢௡௛௘௔௟௧௛೔஽஺௅௒௦௔௩௘௥௧௘ௗ೔  
 
Nonetheless a number of assumptions have been required: i) that elasticities are similar across 
states; ii) that the estimates survival effects of changes in mortality are a good surrogate for 
morbidity effects; and iii) that the morbidity burden of disease is distributed across states in the 
same proportion as the survival burden of disease which can be calculated for each state. 
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DALY 2 
The effect of changes in health expenditure on measures of survival burden of disease (YLL) can also 
be estimated directly from the cross-country data (See Table 2). The estimated elasticity for YLL, ߳௒௅௅ , is only available at a national rather than state level. However, assuming that elasticities are 
similar across states this elasticity can be applied to state specific  ܻܮܮ௜௔௟௟௔௚௘௦  which are calculated 
from observed mortality and conditional life expectancies by age and gender (e.g., see (8) and (9)) 
above). Therefore, YLLs averted due to a 1% change in health expenditure can be directly estimated 
(13) rather than applying conditional life expectancies to estimates of deaths averted by age and 
gender (as required in (1) to (7) above).   
 
(13) ݀݅ݎ݁ܿݐ݈ݕ݁ݏݐ݅݉ܽݐ݁݀ܻܮܮܽݒ݁ݎݐ݁݀ ൌ  ? ?כ ห߳ூ௡ௗ௜௔௒௅௅ ห כ ܻܮܮ௜௔௟௟௔௚௘௦  
 
The possible direct and indirect effects on morbidity of changes in health expenditure which effects 
survival can be calculated in the same way as previously; assuming that the estimated effects on 
survival can be used as a surrogate for likely effects on morbidity and with the indirect effect of 
increases in morbidity based on directly estimated survival effects. Therefore, the net morbidity 
effects are calculated in the same way as in (11) but with directly estimated YLLi averted replacing 
mortality based YLLi averted (E-C in Table 1). 
 
DALY 3 
As well as direct estimates of the effect on survival burden of disease, the effect of changes in health 
expenditure on measures of morbidity burden of disease (YLD) can also be estimated directly from 
the cross-country data (See Table 2). DALY 3 uses direct estimates of the effect on survival burden in 
the same way as DALY 2 but combines these with direct estimates of the effect on morbidity. The 
estimated elasticity for YLD is only available at a national rather than state level. However, assuming 
that elasticities are similar across states this elasticity can be applied to state specific estimates of 
morbidity burden available from the Institute for Health Metrics (IHME) (Indian Council of Medical 
Research et al. 2016). The directly estimated YLD averted for a 1% change in state health 
expenditure is simply the product of the estimated YLD for that state and the estimated YLD 
elasticity for India (14).   
 
(14) ݀݅ݎ݁ܿݐ݈ݕ݁ݏݐ݅݉ܽݐ݁݀ܻܮܦܽݒ݁ݎݐ݁݀ ൌ  ? ?כ ห߳ூ௡ௗ௜௔௒௅஽ ห כ ܻܮܦ௜௔௟௟௔௚௘௦ 
 
The total DALYs averted due to a 1% change in health expenditure in each state is the sum of the 
directly estimated survival effects (YLL averted in (14), D in Table 1) and the directly estimated 
morbidity effects (YLD averted in (14), F in Table 1). 
 
DALY 4 
The combined effect of changes in expenditure on survival and morbidity burden of disease (DALYs 
can be estimated directly from the cross-country data using country-level estimates of DALY burden 
of disease (See Table 2). As for mortality, YLL and YLD the estimated elasticity for DALYs is only 
available at a national rather than state level but can be applied to state specific estimates of DALY 
burden assuming that the estimated elasticity is similar across states. State specific estimates of 
DALY burden (ܦܣܮ ௜ܻ௔௟௟௔௚௘௦) are calculated as the sum of ܻܮܮ௜௔௟௟௔௚௘௦ and ܻܮܦ௜௔௟௟௔௚௘௦  for each state 
i. Therefore, a direct estimate of DALYs averted for a 1% change in provincial health expenditure is 
simply the product of the estimated DALY burden for that state and the estimated elasticity for India 
(16). 
 
(15)  ݀ ݅ݎ݁ܿݐ݈ݕ݁ݏݐ݅݉ܽݐ݁݀ܦܣܮܻܽݒ݁ݎݐ݁݀ ൌ  ? ?כ ห߳ூ௡ௗ௜௔஽஺௅௒ ห כ ܦܣܮ ௜ܻ௔௟௟௔௚௘௦  
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These four alternative ways to estimate health opportunity costs, as measured by the cost per DALY 
averted, make slightly different assumptions. One common one is that estimated elasticities, which 
are currently only available at a national level, can be applied equally across states. This might not be 
unreasonable since the differences in elasticities between countries are quite small based on Bokhari 
et al (2007), although this model only allows for two interaction terms which both have modest 
effects.   
 
Nonetheless, the comparison of DALY 1 with DALY 4 does give some indication of whether it is 
reasonable to use estimates of the mortality effect of changes in health expenditure as a surrogate 
for likely survival and morbidity effects. This is particularly useful as other studies in high income 
countries have estimated elasticities for mortality outcomes using high quality within-country data 
which overcomes some of the difficulties and challenges of estimation based on aggregate country-
level data.    
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Results  
Estimated elasticities for India 
The extended Bokhari et al. (2007) model generated country-specific elasticity results for all of the 
countries in the model (n=127), where the elasticities differed due to the specification of the 
relationship of expenditure with health, which includes interaction terms with level of infrastructure 
and shocks in donor funding. The elasticities for India for each of the six measures of health outcome 
are reported in Table 2 along with the average elasticities of all LMICs in the dataset. 
 
Table 2. Estimated elasticities for India 
 India LMICs (average) 
Mortality (deaths per 1,000) 
Children under-5 -0.3483 -0.3273 
Adults females -0.1937 -0.1744 
Adult males -0.1967 -0.1788 
DALYs -0.2034 -0.2108 
YLLs -0.2900 -0.2980 
YLDs -0.0270 -0.0306 
 
The elasticities generated for India are comparable to the mean of estimates generated for other 
LMICs. Estimated elasticities differ due to the presence of interaction terms combining spending and 
level of infrastructure (proxied by  ?ƉĂǀĞĚƌŽĂĚƐƉĞƌƵŶŝƚŽĨĂƌĞĂ ? ?ĂŶĚƚŚĞĂďƐŽůƵƚĞĚĞǀŝĂƚŝŽŶŝŶĚŽŶŽƌ
funding from the historical mean. India has a relatively high value for the level of infrastructure 
compared to other LMICs (it has the 22nd highest value for this variable of all the 127 countries in 
the Bokhari dataset, including HICs) and also a lower than average deviation in donor funding (it has 
a low level of donor funding, more generally, compared to other LMICs). Between these two factors, 
the differences in the elasticities for India compared to other LMICs can be explained, where the 
direction and size of the difference depends upon the signs of the estimated coefficients on the 
interaction terms and relative magnitude of each of these.   
 
Cost per DALY averted 
The estimates of cost per DALY averted for India as a whole and for each state are reported in Table 
3 and are also expressed as a % of GDP per capita. 
 
The estimates of cost per DALY for India as a whole are not the average of the cost per DALY ratios 
across the states but the ratio of the sum of changes in expenditure to the sum of DALYs averted 
across the states. The cost per DALY for India as a whole using DALY 1 and DALY 4 falls between 
those using DALY 2 and 3, which does give some indication that it might be reasonable to use 
estimates of the mortality effect of changes in health expenditure as a surrogate for likely survival 
and morbidity effects. This is also reflected in the results by state where DALY 1 and DALY 4 tend to 
provide relatively similar estimates, with the exception of two states (Delhi and Himachal Pradesh).   
 
DALY 1 and 2 consistently provide the lowest cost per DALY for India as a whole and across the 
states. This reflects the fact that the estimated elasticity for mortality and survival effects (YLL) are 
similar and both greater in magnitude than for morbidity effects (YLD) (see Table 2). This larger 
effect on survival (whether based on mortality or YLL averted) is then used as a surrogate for 
morbidity effects when estimating DALY 1 and 2. However, DALY 3 consistently provides the highest 
cost per DALY averted estimate for India and for each of the states with the exception of Andhra 
Pradesh. This reflects fewer DALYs averted due to the much lower magnitude of the estimated 
10  CHE Research Paper 161 
elasticity for morbidity effects (YLD), i.e. the smaller effect on morbidity more than offsets the larger 
effect on survival compared to DALYs 1 and 2. Although these differences and the differences in the 
elasticities reported in Table 2 might indicate that both mortality effects and survival effects may 
overestimate morbidity effects, this should not be over-interpreted as the estimated elasticities are 
not based on Indian within-country data but country-level data with limited interactions for country-
level effects. However, in general the comparison of DALY 1 and DALY 4 does suggest that using 
estimates of the mortality effect of changes in health expenditure as a surrogate for likely survival 
and morbidity effects may not be unreasonable albeit with additional uncertainty. 
 
Table 3. Cost per DALY averted and as a percent of GDP per capita by state 
 Cost per DALY averted (2015 INR) 
  
 
Rank (by 
average, 
highest to 
lowest) DALY 1 DALY 2 DALY 3 DALY 4 
India 14         14,116          14,484       22,275       19,182  
   14% 14% 22% 19% 
Andhra Pradesh 21         8,238          6,447          8,620          8,704  
 
 13% 10% 14% 14% 
Assam 18         6,171          7,553       11,326          9,972  
   10% 12% 18% 16% 
Bihar 22         4,747          4,797          7,338          6,381  
 
 13% 13% 20% 18% 
Chhattisgarh 12      11,411       11,313       16,688       14,935  
   12% 12% 18% 16% 
Gujarat 7      13,541       13,515       20,860       17,881  
 
 9% 9% 14% 12% 
Haryana 11      11,103       11,718       18,107       15,469  
   6% 7% 11% 9% 
Himachal Pradesh 2      28,669       27,370       42,701       36,341  
 
 19% 18% 28% 24% 
Jammu and Kashmir 5      16,886       17,474       27,180       23,411  
   21% 22% 34% 29% 
Jharkhand 20         6,186          6,921       10,824          9,226  
 
 9% 11% 16% 14% 
Karnataka 8      13,798       13,040       21,032       17,298  
   9% 9% 14% 11% 
Kerala 3      22,454       17,841       31,794       23,783  
 
 14% 11% 20% 15% 
Madhya Pradesh 17         6,698          7,470       10,437          9,830  
   10% 11% 16% 15% 
Maharashtra 10      12,629       11,120       18,538       14,806  
 
 8% 7% 12% 9% 
Odisha 15         8,514          9,134       13,606       12,023  
   11% 12% 18% 16% 
Punjab 9      13,766       12,253       19,431       16,257  
 
 10% 9% 15% 12% 
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Rajasthan 13      10,421       11,716       17,154       15,497  
   12% 13% 19% 17% 
Tamil Nadu 6      16,798       14,244       23,570       18,898  
 
 11% 9% 16% 12% 
Uttar Pradesh 19         6,600          7,281       10,432          9,615  
   13% 14% 20% 19% 
Uttarakhand 4      20,781       19,086       28,215       25,273  
 
 13% 12% 18% 16% 
West Bengal 16         8,040          7,554       12,859       10,060  
   9% 9% 15% 11% 
Delhi 1      26,166       29,478       59,057       39,761  
 
 9% 10% 21% 14% 
 
The four alternative ways to calculate cost per DALY averted each provide relatively similar 
estimates across most states. To some extent this might be expected as it is assumed that estimated 
elasticities, which are currently only available at a national level, can be applied equally across 
states. Insofar as states have similar health expenditure per capita and similar mortality rates, 
conditional life expectancies and population distribution, the cost per DALY averted will inevitably be 
very similar. This also explains why the cost per DALY averted differs for some states where per 
capital heath expenditure is higher and where the population, mortality rates and conditional life 
expectancies differ (e.g., Himachal Pradesh, Jammu and Kashmir, Kerala and Delhi).   
 
Figure 1 illustrates the range of estimates for India and for each state by under-5 mortality rate. The 
average of the range of values for each state is not the average for the four cost per DALY ratios but 
the ratio of a 1% change in expenditure to the average DALYs averted across these four estimates. A 
pattern is evident between mortality rate and cost per DALY averted. While the low under-5 
mortality in Delhi would, other things equal tend to increase the cost per DALY averted, it is higher in 
Delhi than in Tamil Nadu and Maharashtra, which have similar under-5 mortality rates primarily 
because Delhi has higher government expenditure on health.    
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Figure 1. Cost per DALY averted by under-5 mortality rate 
 
Figure 2 illustrates the same cost per DALY averted estimates but now by per capita government 
expenditure on health. It suggests that the cost per DALY averted increases with per capita health 
expenditure which is, in general, what might be expected, although this is to some extent inevitable 
given the methods used to generate these estimates. It also illustrates the similarity in the range of 
estimates for most states but also why others (Delhi and Jammu and Kashmir) differ. The apparent 
similarity in the range of cost per DALY averted between most states should not be over interpreted 
as estimates would also be expected to differ if states are able to generate health at different rates, 
which would be reflected in differing elasticities. This underscores the importance of further 
research to estimate these values at the provincial level in India using within-country and within-
state data. 
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Figure 2. Cost per DALY averted by per capita government expenditure on health 
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Discussion 
Estimates of the health opportunity costs of additional health care expenditure are critical for 
informing assessments of whether the improvement in health outcomes offered by investing 
additional resources in a new health technology exceeds the improvement in health that would have 
been possible if the additional resources required had, instead, been made available for other health 
care activities. Commonly established implied norms, such as 1-3x GDP per capita, are often 
inappropriately applied in practice to judge cost-effectiveness (Bertram et al. 2016). Such values 
generally reflect the social demand for health (i.e. a view of what value ought to be placed on 
improvements in health) rather than an evidence-based assessment of health opportunity costs 
given actual levels of expenditure. As such, they do not reflect the health that the HCS is currently 
able to deliver with the resources available, i.e. ƚŚĞ ?ƐƵƉƉůǇƐŝĚĞ ?ŽĨƚŚĞ,^. Adopting  ?thresholdƐ ? to 
judge cost effectivenesƐǁŚŝĐŚĂƌĞƚŽŽŚŝŐŚĂŶĚĚŽŶŽƚƌĞĨůĞĐƚƚŚĞ ?ƐƵƉƉůǇƐŝĚĞ ?ǁŝůůůĞĂĚƚŽĚĞĐŝƐŝŽŶƐ
that reduce overall health because the health gained from adopting a new technology will be more 
than offset by the health opportunity costs elsewhere in the HCS. It will also mean that the HCS will 
pay too much for the benefits offered by new branded pharmaceuticals because the additional cost 
of patented innovations will do more harm than good for population health during the remaining 
patent period. As well as leading to net harms for population health it may also exacerbate health 
inequalities and unwarranted variations in access to other health care, depending on where the 
health opportunity costs of additional health care costs tend to fall. 
 
The framework of analysis set out in this report illustrates how estimates of the relationship 
between mortality and variations in health care expenditure can be employed alongside state 
specific data on demography, epidemiologic profile and expenditure to inform estimates of health 
opportunity costs. While data is readily available for the latter, reliable estimates of the relationship 
between mortality and variations in health care expenditure present a challenge.  
 
This report employed an estimate for India estimated using the model used by Bokhari et al (2007), 
which applies an instrumental variable method to cross-sectional data and models both public 
expenditure on health and a country's GDP as endogenous variables. While Bokhari et al. (2007) find 
a statistically and economically significant effect of public expenditure on health reducing mortality 
outcomes, there is no clear and consistent finding in the literature that evaluates the relationship 
between mortality and variations in health care expenditure using country-level data (Gallet & 
Doucouliagos 2017). This is often driven by the methodological approach adopted by each study, 
addressing the considerable challenges including the important country-level heterogeneity, much 
of which is unobserved and controlled for using existing data, even if it is assumed that 
systematically unbiased measurements are available. Estimates of mortality elasticities based on 
country-level data tend to be lower than those based on within-country data which are likely to 
reflect the greater dangers of aggregation bias using country-level data and the difficulty of fully 
accounting for unobserved heterogeneity and endogeneity using the instruments for health 
expenditure that are available across countries. 
 
Unusually for a LMIC, a number of studies have analysed the relationship between certain types of 
mortality and public expenditure on health using somewhat historic data from across the states of 
India. Delalikar (2005) analyse a panel dataset comprising data from 1980-1999. While public 
expenditure on health was largely increasing for most states at the same time as infant mortality 
falling during this period, no statistically significant association is found after controlling for a linear 
time trend. The authors also investigate how the elasticity varies by state income, finding that the 
infant mortality elasticity declines as income increases. Bhalotra (2007) analyses data from a longer 
time period of 1970-1998 and is able to replicate this null-result of Delalikar (2005). However, by 
allowing for lagged effects of expenditure and constructing the infant mortality variable at an 
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individual level, they are also able to analyse heterogeneous effects and a strong effect of health 
expenditure in reducing infant mortality in rural areas. Their econometric analysis uses a probit 
model and so an elasticity is not directly estimated, but the authors calculate that the long-run infant 
mortality elasticity is roughly -0.24. Unfortunately, neither of these studies estimate any of the 
elasticities required to implement the Ochalek et al. (2018) framework. A third paper by Farahani et 
al. (2010) analyses cross-sectional data from 1998 and employs an IV approach (state fiscal deficit). 
They also estimate a probit model and so coefficients and marginal effects are not directly 
interpretable as elasticities, but the authors calculate an all-cause mortality elasticity estimate of -
0.2. The authors estimate a range of effect-modifiers including gender, rurality, socioeconomic 
status and age of the individual. Again, unfortunately, none of the elasticities used in the Ochalek et 
al. (2018) framework are estimated by this study. Much like the literature using data from across 
countries, there is no consistent finding from analyses that consider data from across Indian states. 
However, the literature on health effects of public expenditure on health does emphasise the 
importance of heterogeneity across states and therefore the value to estimating state-specific 
elasticities as future research. 
  
Importantly, the framework of analysis employed here can be adapted to use the results of any 
econometric study which is thought to identify plausible effects on mortality of changes or 
differences in health expenditure study as inputs (see interactive tool: Ochalek et al. 2017). In 
addition to the studies discussed above, a number of recent studies have used within-country data 
to estimate elasticities. However, these tend to be limited to high-income countries (Martin et al. 
2008; Claxton, Martin, et al. 2015; Vallejo-Torres et al. 2016; Edney et al. 2017). The implied all-
cause mortality elasticity estimate, -1.0278, found by Claxton et al (2017) is considerably higher in 
magnitude to any of the mortality elasticity estimates from the extended Bokhari et al (2007) model. 
Another study, Andrews et al (2017) used an alternative approach to identification to directly 
estimate an all-cause mortality elasticity estimate for the UK NHS of -0.705. Once again, this is higher 
than the results from Bokhari et al (2007). Edney et al (2017) and Vallejo-Torres et al (2016) perform 
similar studies in the contexts of Australia and Spain. The overall results in terms of expenditure per 
QALY give similar results to these UK studies, but the elasticities cannot be directly compared. In the 
case of Edney et al. (2017), an elasticity, -1.602, is estimated on HRQoL-weighted YLL reflecting the 
percentage change in QALYs resulting from delayed mortality for a given percentage increase in 
expenditure. Vallejo-Torres et al. (2016) instead estimate an elasticity, -0.0681, reflecting the 
percentage effect on Quality Adjusted Life Expectancy (QALE) that results from a given percentage 
increase in expenditure in a given year, which would then need to be sustained over the lifetime 
period (Lichtenberg 2004). 
 
Previous work has estimated cost per DALY averted for 123 low- and middle-income countries based 
on elasticities estimated from the Bokhari et al (2007) model but country-level data on health 
expenditure, epidemiology and demographics from GBD and the World Bank (Ochalek et al. 2018).  
Using these sources, which have been standardised to be internationally comparable, rather than 
Indian data would have resulted in slightly higher (5-33%) estimates of the DALYs averted for a 1% 
change in Indian health expenditure. If the health expenditure variable between the data sets was 
the same, this would result in a slightly lower cost per DALY averted estimates. However, the 
government health expenditure variable used in Ochalek et al (2018), a World Bank estimate, is 
slightly higher than what is reported in the National Health Accounts (National Health Accounts 
Technical Secretariat 2017). As a result, the range of cost per DALY averted for India from the 
ĐƵƌƌĞŶƚƐƚƵĚǇ ?༤ ? ? ? ? ? ?ƚŽ ? ? ? ? ? ? ?ŝƐǀĞƌǇƐŝŵŝůĂƌƚŽƚŚĂƚĨƌŽŵ Ochalek et al (2018 ? ?༤ ? ? ? ? ? ?ƚŽ
༤23,046) (see Table 3). However, it is the larger differences due to alternative but plausible effects 
on mortality of changes in health expenditure illustrated in Table 4 which indicate the importance of 
further research to provide state specific elasticity estimates for India using within-country and 
within-state data.   
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Further research 
Improving estimates of health opportunity costs for the Indian states could focus on the following 
issues: First and foremost, estimating under-5, adult male and adult female mortality elasticities for 
India as a whole or for each of the states using within-country data. Second, while estimated 
mortality effects do not appear to be a poor surrogate for morbidity effects from this analysis, it 
would also be of value to estimate the elasticity of health expenditure for outcomes beyond 
mortality using within-country data where possible. Third, given the vast heterogeneity across states 
in India, research to estimate state-specific elasticities would potentially be viable and useful. 
 
Conclusions from this analysis, interpretation and next steps 
The range of potential cost per DALY averted for India ŝƐ༤ ? ? ? ? ?ƚŽ༤ ? ? ? ? ? ?and for the states is in 
the region of ༤5,000 to ༤60,000 per DALY averted (see Table 3). Given the greater dangers of 
aggregation bias using country-level data and the difficulty of fully accounting for unobserved 
heterogeneity and endogeneity using the instruments for health expenditure that are available 
across countries this suggests that estimates based on within-country data may be lower. The range 
estimated here is also consistent with the range of implied cost per QALY gained for India based on 
the analysis in Woods et al 2016 (༤7,500 to ༤50,000 converted from 2013 US$ to 2015 INR), which 
extrapolates the UK findings based on estimates of the income elasticity of demand for health and 
assumptions about the relative underfunding of HCS (i.e. the shadow price for public expenditure on 
health). Estimates based on this analysis have been adopted in Norway while further research using 
within-country data are explored. Nonetheless further research to provide updated Indian and/or 
state specific elasticity estimates using within-country and within-state data would be a priority.   
 
Estimates of an updated all-cause mortality elasticity for India as a whole could exploit cross 
sectional variation in expenditure and outcomes, seeking potential instruments from socioeconomic 
variables and/or exogenous elements in how funding tends to be allocated, following Claxton et al 
(2017) and Andrews et al (2017) respectively. This would start to identify where in the range of 
estimates might be most plausible. However, it would still require that a single elasticity estimated 
at a national level be applied equally across all states. It would also mean that differences between 
states would be modest and may not reflect real differences in the marginal productivity for health 
care expenditure, i.e. insofar as states have similar health expenditure per capita and similar 
mortality rates, conditional life expectancies and population distribution, then the cost per DALY or 
QALY estimates will also be very similar. This could be relaxed by attempting to estimate all-cause 
elasticities for each state. Building on the approach taken in published studies reviewed here this 
might be possible using interaction terms for state when estimating a national all-cause model or 
estimating separate state specific all-cause models. The latter poses the challenge of finding units of 
analysis with sufficient variation in expenditure and outcomes within-state as well as suitable 
instruments. 
 
However, in general, direct estimates of all-cause elasticities tend to be lower than those implied by 
estimates at disease area level because they are likely to be subject to some aggregation bias 
compared to those which are able to capture any heterogeneity of effect by disease area. Therefore, 
it would be an advantage to estimate elasticities (national and for states) by disease areas. However 
this would require expenditure by disease area as well as mortality outcomes to be available at the 
unit of analysis that will provide sufficient variation. Nonetheless updated estimates of all-cause 
elasticities for India and/or the states based on within-country data would be a significant 
improvement over existing estimates, whether or not they are directly estimated or implied by 
estimates at disease area level. They would start to identify where in the ༤ ? ? ? ? ?ƚŽ༤ ? ? ? ? ? ?range 
would be most plausible using the framework of analysis in this paper. 
 
Assessing health opportunity costs for the Indian health care systems  17 
References 
Andrews, M. et al., 2017. Inference in the presence of redundant moment conditions and the impact 
of government health expenditure on health outcomes in England. Econometric Reviews, 36(1 W3), 
pp.23 W41. Available at: https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/07474938.2016.1114205 
[Accessed January 23, 2018]. 
 
Bertram, M.Y. et al., 2016. Use and misuse of thresholds Cost Weffectiveness thresholds: pros and 
cons. Bulletin of the World Health Organization. Available at: 
http://www.who.int/bulletin/online_first/en/ [Accessed October 6, 2016]. 
 
ŚĂůŽƚƌĂ ?^ ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?^ƉĞŶĚŝŶŐƚŽƐĂǀĞ ?^ƚĂƚĞŚĞĂůƚŚĞǆƉĞŶĚŝƚƵƌĞĂŶĚŝŶĨĂŶƚŵŽƌƚĂůŝƚǇŝŶ/ŶĚŝĂ ? ? Health 
Economics, 16(9), pp. 911 W928. doi: 10.1002/hec.1260.   
 
Bokhari, F.A.S., Gai, Y. & Gottret, P., 2007. Government health expenditures and health outcomes. 
Health Economics, 16(3), pp.257 W73. Available at: http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/17001737 
[Accessed November 27, 2015]. 
 
Claxton, K., Sculpher, M., et al., 2015. Causes for concern: is NICE failing to uphold its responsibilities 
to all NHS patients? Health Economics, 24(1), pp.1 W7. Available at: 
http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/25488707 [Accessed November 27, 2015]. 
 
Claxton, K., Martin, S., et al., 2015. Methods for the estimation of the National Institute for Health 
and Care Excellence cost-effectiveness threshold. Health Technology Assessment (Winchester, 
England), 19(14), pp.1 W503, v Wvi. Available at: http://www.journalslibrary.nihr.ac.uk/hta/volume-
19/issue-14#abstract [Accessed November 17, 2015]. 
 
Claxton, K. et al., 2008. Value based pricing for NHS drugs: an opportunity not to be missed? BMJ 
(Clinical Research ed.), 336(7638), pp.251 W4. Available at: 
http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/18244997 [Accessed January 31, 2018]. 
 
Claxton, K., Lomas, J. & Martin, S., 2017. Estimating Expected Health Opportunity Costs in the NHS 
(Analysis of 2012/13 Expenditure Data), York. Available at: 
https://www.york.ac.uk/media/che/documents/Estimating_expected_health_opportunity_costs_in
_the_NHS_201213.pdf [Accessed January 23, 2018]. 
 
Claxton, K., Sculpher, M. & Carroll, S., 2011. Value-based pricing for pharmaceuticals: Its role, 
specification and prospects in a newly devolved NHS Background to series, York. Available at: 
https://www.york.ac.uk/media/che/documents/papers/researchpapers/CHERP60_value_based_pric
ing_for_pharmaceuticals.pdf [Accessed January 31, 2018]. 
 
Culyer, A.J., 2016. Cost-effectiveness thresholds in health care: a bookshelf guide to their meaning 
and use. Health Economics, Policy and Law, 11(04), pp.415 W432. Available at: 
http://www.journals.cambridge.org/abstract_S1744133116000049 [Accessed January 23, 2018]. 
 
Downey, L.E. et al., 2017. Institutionalising health technology assessment: establishing the Medical 
Technology Assessment Board in India. BMJ Global Health, 2(2), p.e000259. Available at: 
http://gh.bmj.com/lookup/doi/10.1136/bmjgh-2016-000259 [Accessed November 7, 2017]. 
 
 
 
18  CHE Research Paper 161 
Edney, L.C. et al., 2017. Estimating the Reference Incremental Cost-Effectiveness Ratio for the 
Australian Health System. PharmacoEconomics. Available at: 
http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/29273843 [Accessed January 23, 2018]. 
 
Farahani, M., Subramanian, ^ ?sĂŶĚĂŶŶŝŶŐ ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?ĨĨĞĐƚƐŽĨƐƚĂƚĞ-level public spending on 
ŚĞĂůƚŚŽŶƚŚĞŵŽƌƚĂůŝƚǇƉƌŽďĂďŝůŝƚǇŝŶ/ŶĚŝĂ ? ? ?Health Economics. NIH Public Access, 19(11), pp. 1361 W
76. doi: 10.1002/hec.1557.   
 
Filmer, D. & Pritchett, L., 1999. The impact of public spending on health: does money matter? Social 
Science & Medicine (1982), 49(10), pp.1309 W23. Available at: 
http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/10509822 [Accessed November 30, 2015]. 
 
Gallet, C.A. & Doucouliagos, H., 2017. The impact of healthcare spending on health outcomes: A 
meta-regression analysis. Social Science & Medicine, 179, pp.9 W17. Available at: 
http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/28237460 [Accessed January 23, 2018]. 
 
Indian Council of Medical Research, Public Health Foundation of India & Institute for Health Metrics 
and Evaluation, 2016. GBD India Compare | IHME Viz Hub. Available at: 
https://vizhub.healthdata.org/gbd-compare/india [Accessed February 12, 2018]. 
 
Lichtenberg, F.R., 2004. Sources of U.S. longevity increase, 1960 W2001. The Quarterly Review of 
Economics and Finance, 44(3), pp.369 W389. Available at: 
https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S1062976904000377 [Accessed January 23, 
2018]. 
 
Martin, S., Rice, N. & Smith, P.C., 2008. Does health care spending improve health outcomes? 
Evidence from English programme budgeting data. Journal of Health Economics, 27(4), pp.826 W842. 
Available at: http://ideas.repec.org/a/eee/jhecon/v27y2008i4p826-842.html [Accessed November 
30, 2015]. 
 
Nakamura, R. et al., 2016. Assessing the Impact of Health Care Expenditures on Mortality Using 
Cross-Country Data, York. Available at: 
https://www.york.ac.uk/media/che/documents/papers/researchpapers/CHERP128_health_care_ex
penditures_mortality_cross-country_data.pdf [Accessed May 3, 2017]. 
 
National Health Accounts Technical Secretariat, 2017. National Health Accounts Estimates for India 
2014-15, Delhi. Available at: https://mohfw.gov.in/newshighlights/national-health-accounts-
estimates-india-2014-15 [Accessed February 9, 2018]. 
 
Ochalek, J., Lomas, J. & Claxton, K., 2017. Estimating health opportunity costs for LMICs. Available at: 
https://www.york.ac.uk/che/research/teehta/health-opportunity-costs/estimating-health-
opportunity-costs-for-lmics/#tab-4. 
 
Ochalek, J., Lomas, J. & Claxton, K., 2018. Estimating health opportunity costs in low-income and 
middle-income countries: a novel approach and evidence from cross-country data. BMJ Global 
Health, 3(6), p.e000964. Available at: http://gh.bmj.com/lookup/doi/10.1136/bmjgh-2018-000964 
[Accessed November 19, 2018]. 
 
 
 
 
Assessing health opportunity costs for the Indian health care systems  19 
Office of the Registrar General & Census Commissioner, I., 2016. Census of India Website: SRS 
Statistical Report 2015. Available at: 
http://www.censusindia.gov.in/vital_statistics/SRS_Reports_2015.html [Accessed February 12, 
2018]. 
 
Office of the Registrar General & Census Commissioner, I., 2011. Single Year Age Data - C13 Table 
(India/States/UTs ). Census of India Website. Available at: 
http://www.censusindia.gov.in/2011census/Age_level_data/Age_level_data.html [Accessed 
February 12, 2018]. 
 
Office of the Registrar General, I., 2015. VITAL STATISTICS OF INDIA BASED ON THE CIVIL 
REGISTRATION SYSTEM 2015, New Delhi. Available at: http://www.censusindia.gov.in/2011-
Documents/CRS_Report/crs_report 2015_23062017.pdf [Accessed February 12, 2018]. 
 
Prinja, S. et al., 2015. A Systematic Review of the State of Economic Evaluation for Health Care in 
India. Applied Health Economics and Health Policy, 13(6), pp.595 W613. Available at: 
http://link.springer.com/10.1007/s40258-015-0201-6 [Accessed November 7, 2017]. 
 
Reserve Bank of India, 2017. HANDBOOK OF STATISTICS ON INDIAN STATES, Mumbai. Available at: 
https://rbidocs.rbi.org.in/rdocs/Publications/PDFs/0HSIS20161758823DC1A43041EC9CCD080D0EE7
DA3B.PDF [Accessed February 12, 2018]. 
 
Revill, P. et al., 2014. Using cost-effectiveness thresholds to determine value for money in low- and 
middle-income country healthcare systems: are current international norms fit for purpose?, York. 
Available at: 
https://www.york.ac.uk/media/che/documents/papers/researchpapers/CHERP98_costeffectiveness
_thresholds_value_low_middle_income_countries.pdf [Accessed November 27, 2015]. 
 
Salomon, J.A. et al., 2012. Common values in assessing health outcomes from disease and injury: 
disability weights measurement study for the Global Burden of Disease Study 2010. The Lancet, 
380(9859), pp.2129 W2143. Available at: 
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0140673612616808 [Accessed May 25, 2017]. 
 
The World Bank (2004) Attaining the MillĞŶŶŝƵŵĞǀĞůŽƉŵĞŶƚ'ŽĂůƐŝŶ/ŶĚŝĂථ P,Žǁ>ŝŬĞůǇĂŶĚtŚĂƚ
Will It Take to Reduce Infant Mortality, Child Malnutrition, Gender Disparities and Hunger-Poverty 
and to Increase School Enrollment and Completion?, World Bank Other Operational Studies. The 
World Bank. Available at: https://ideas.repec.org/p/wbk/wboper/15738.html (Accessed: 13 
February 2019). 
 
Vallejo-Torres, L. et al., 2016. On the Estimation of the Cost-Effectiveness Threshold: Why, What, 
How? Value in Health, 19(5), pp.558 W566. Available at: 
http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/27565273 [Accessed February 28, 2017]. 
 
Woods, B. et al., 2016. Country-Level Cost-Effectiveness Thresholds: Initial Estimates and the Need 
for Further Research. Value in Health, 19(8), pp.929 W935. 
 
  
20  CHE Research Paper 161 
Appendix A.  Variables used to calculate DALYs averted 
 
Variable Measure used Source Year used 
1-year 
probability of 
death for 
females, males 
and both for 
ages in a given 
five-year age 
category 
(n-n+4) 
Where life table data is given by 1-year age 
group (e.g., 0-1):  
 ܲሺܽ݊݊ݑ݈ܽ݉݋ݎݐ݈ܽ݅ݐݕ݊ݐ݋݊ ൅  ?ሻ ൌ  ? െ൭ෑሺ ? െ ݌௧ሻ௡ାସ௧ୀ௡ ൱
ଵହ
 
 
 
Where life table data is given by 5-year age 
group: 
 ܲሺܽ݊݊ݑ݈ܽ݉݋ݎݐ݈ܽ݅ݐݕ݊ݐ݋݊ ൅  ?ሻ ൌ  ? െሺ ? െ ݌௡௧௢௡ାସሻଵହ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Sample Registration System 
(SRS) Statistical Report 2015 
life tables, Office of the 
Registrar General & Census 
Commissioner, India 
Ministry of Home Affairs, 
Government of India 
http://www.censusindia.gov.i
n/vital_statistics/SRS_Reports
_2015.html   
(Office of the Registrar 
General & Census 
Commissioner 2016) 
 
2015 
Conditional life 
expectancy for  
females, males 
and both by 
five-year age 
category 
(n-n+4) 
݁௫  by age category 0-85+.   
 
Absolute 
number of  
death for 
females, males 
and by five-year 
age category  
(n-n+4) 
ܣܾݏ݋݈ݑݐ݁݀݁ܽݐ݄ݏ݊ݐ݋݊ ൅  ?ൌ ܲሺܽ݊݊ݑ݈ܽ݉݋ݎݐ݈ܽ݅ݐݕ݊ݐ݋݊ ൅  ?ሻכ ݌݋݌ݑ݈ܽݐ݅݋݊݊ݐ݋݊ ൅  ? 
 
Calculated from p(death) and 
population variables 
Population  by 
females, males 
and both by 
five-year age 
category (n-
n+4) 
Population by 5-year age category 0-85+. Total population in mid-year 
2015 comes from (Civil 
Registration System (CRS) 
Vital Statistics of India, 
Statement 2).    
http://www.censusindia.gov.i
n/2011-
Documents/CRS_Report/crs_r
eport%202015_23062017.pdf 
(Office of the Registrar 
General 2015) 
 
% of population in each age 
group 2015 comes from 
Detailed Tables, Table 1, SRS 
Report, for each 5-year 
category.  (Office of the 
Registrar General & Census 
Commissioner 2016) 
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Because probability of death 
data is further disaggregated 
into <1 and 1-4, we augment 
this with data from the 2011 
Census about the distribution 
of the population under-5 and 
assume this distribution does 
not change for each state 
between 2011 and 2015.  For 
Telangana we use the 
distribution from Andra 
Pradesh as Telangana was still 
in Andra Pradesh in 2011 so 
there is no population data 
for Telangana in census 
2011.SRS report (see above 
links); 2011 census - 
http://www.censusindia.gov.i
n/2011census/Age_level_data
/Age_level_data.html (Office 
of the Registrar General & 
Census Commissioner 2011) 
Per capita GDP 
(2015 INR) 
GDP at factor cost (Current Prices) / Total 
Population  
Table 15. GDP at factor cost 
(current prices), Handbook of 
Statistics on Indian States.  
(Reserve Bank of India 2017) 
 
2014-15 
Government 
health 
expenditure 
(2015 INR) 
Total value, current dollars Table A.6: Key Health 
Financing Indicators for select 
States: NHA Estimates 2014-
15, National Health Accounts 
Estimates for India 2014-15.  
https://mohfw.gov.in/newshi
ghlights/national-health-
accounts-estimates-india-
2014-15  (National Health 
Accounts Technical 
Secretariat 2017) 
 
Note: Delhi and West Bengal 
values are from 2013-14 NHA 
as 2015-16 values were not 
available. 
2014-15 
YLL ܻܮܮ௜௔௟௟௔௚௘௦  ൌ 
 ܥܮܧ௜଴ିସ כ ܾܽݏ݋݈ݑݐ݁݀݁ܽݐ݄ݏ௜଴ିସ ൅ ܥܮܧ௜ହିଽכ ܾܽݏ݋݈ݑݐ݁݀݁ܽݐ݄ݏ௜ହିଽ ൅ ڮ൅ ܥܮܧ௜଼ ହ௔௡ௗ௢௩௘௥כ ܾܽݏ݋݈ݑݐ݁݀݁ܽݐ݄ݏ௜଼ ହ௔௡ௗ௢௩௘௥ 
Calculated from absolute 
deaths and conditional life 
expectancy variables 
2015 
22  CHE Research Paper 161 
 
YLD Total for all diseases by state Institute for Health Metrics 
and Evaluation Viz Hub  
https://vizhub.healthdata.org
/gbd-compare/india 
(Indian Council of Medical 
Research et al. 2016) 
2016 
DALY ܦܣܮ ௜ܻ ൌ ܻܮܮ௜ ൅ ܻܮܦ௜  Calculated from YLL and YLD 
variables 
2015-16 
